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Two Formulas for Success in Social Media: Learning and Network Effects 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented explosion in information technology that enables 
dynamic diffusion of user-generated content in social networks. Online videos, in particular, have 
changed the landscape of marketing and entertainment, competing with premium content and spurring 
business innovations. In the present study, we examine how learning and network effects drive the 
diffusion of online videos. While learning happens through informational externalities, network effects 
are direct payoff externalities. Using a unique data set from YouTube, we empirically identify learning 
and network effects separately, and find that both mechanisms have statistically and economically 
significant effects on video views; furthermore, the mechanism that dominates depends on the video 
type. Specifically, although learning primarily drives the popularity of quality-oriented content, 
network effects make it also possible for attention-grabbing content to go viral. Theoretically, we show 
that, unlike the diffusion of movies, it is the combination of both learning and network effects that 
generate the multiplier effect for the diffusion of online videos. From a managerial perspective, 
providers can adopt different strategies to promote their videos accordingly, that is, signaling the 
quality or featuring the viewer base depending on the video type. Our results also suggest that 
YouTube can play a much greater role in encouraging the creation of original content by leveraging the 
multiplier effect. 
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“You’ve got to create images they won’t accept. Make them foam at the mouth. Force them to 
understand that they’re living in a pretty queer world.” 
— Andre Malraux, “Picasso Mask” (1976), page 110.   
                                        
Introduction 
With new products such as consumer goods, financial services, and movies constantly flooding 
the markets, consumers face an already overwhelmingly large and rapidly growing choice set. 
Meanwhile, consumers receive various bits of information that generates two types of externalities: 
informational externalities and direct payoff externalities. Informational externalities exist when one’s 
payoff depends on information that is privately held by others, and therefore are created when 
information about product quality is conveyed through direct communication/observation or indirect 
word-of-month [62, 51, 12, 16]. Positive payoff externalities exist when one’s payoff depends 
positively on the number of other people who consume the product, and therefore are affected directly 
by others’ actions [34]. Whereas the former is generally referred to as “learning” or “observational 
learning” [16, 26, 53], the latter is often called “network effects” or “network externalities” [34, 22, 
18]. 
For products with strong network effects, creating a large user base is crucial in attracting new 
adopters. In contrast, generating positive word-of-mouth (WOM) is the key for products with 
prevailing learning effects. Susarla et al. [57] found that initial WOM conversations generated early in 
the life of a YouTube video have a persistent impact on subsequent popularity. In many situations, 
both mechanisms may be present at the same time. Which mechanism exists or dominates then 
depends on the specific product in question. When choosing a mobile network operator, network 
effects may dominate because of free mobile-to-mobile calling. When purchasing an HDTV, learning 
becomes the primary force because consumers are mainly concerned with quality.  
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Following the expectation–disconfirmation paradigm [44], we estimate the learning effects and 
network effects for social media content consumption by identifying disconfirmation/surprise resulting 
from a comparison of prior expectations with the actual consumption experience in the context of 
YouTube. According to this paradigm, expectation is the reference for a comparative judgment, and a 
negative (positive) surprise is rated below (above) this reference point [44]. Selecting online videos to 
watch is one of the most common choices consumers make every day. According to ComScore, the 
average user spent about 43 minutes watching online videos in June 2013, and Google websites 
(primarily YouTube) account for approximately 40% of that time, about 17 minutes.1 According to 
YouTube statistics, 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute. Given the vast 
reservoir of online videos, choosing videos to watch can become a complicated issue. On the one hand, 
consumers receive various pieces of information from friends, which can help them infer video quality. 
Such learning can take the form of direct communication and discussion with, or interpersonal and 
impersonal observation of, others [16]. On the other hand, frequent social sharing creates network 
effects when a video becomes a fad. Frequent social sharing may not be due to the quality of the video, 
but instead because of the emotional arousal while watching the video [35]. Particularly for a viral 
video, consumers have strong incentives to watch it so as to discuss it in social encounters. Many 
YouTube videos go viral with only pointless-seeming jokes, funny pictures, weird scenarios, or even 
offensive pranks, but they bring people together around something. Sharing allows people to engage 
with interesting people, including those they otherwise might not be aware of; furthermore, the way 
people interact with social media content is more about someone’s emotional or even intellectual 
reaction [60]. The strength of learning depends on the surprise of the video quality and the accuracy of 
prior expectation, whereas the strength of network effects is related to social sharing which can be 
attributed to the emotional arousal generated. Therefore, the relative strengths of the two effects can 
vary across different types of videos. 
                                                 
1 See http://www.comscore.com/insights/Press_Releases/2013/7/comScore_Releases_June_2013_US_Online_Video_Rankings. 
5 
 
 Most existing studies on social contagion have focused on the Manski problem [38]: 
distinguishing general social contagion from homophily—the tendency of individuals to associate with 
similar others [8, 13, 61]. Few of them differentiated between the two mechanisms of social contagion: 
learning and network effects. To fill the gap, we are interested in the diffusion angle of learning and 
network effects, and study user-generated content in social media from the social contagion 
perspective. Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of our study. Learning, the informational 
externalities, affects consumers through the quality information conveyed by peers, whereas network 
effects, the payoff externalities, influence consumers according to the size of the user base. Although 
these mechanisms lead to similar empirical outcome, their implications are vastly different. If 
contagion is generated mainly by network effects, then seeding strategies, which determine the initial 
set of targeted consumers, will by implication have a strong influence on the success of viral marketing. 
Accordingly, a firm can amplify social contagion and accelerate product purchases by offering 
introductory discounts [31]. If learning is the dominant effect, however, seeding will not be effective 
unless the initial consumers generate positive word-of-mouth. Consumers can infer that the high 
demand among their peers is caused by the introductory discount rather than the high product quality 
[46]. Both cases are theoretically plausible and need to be empirically distinguished. 
Given the lack of pre-release marketing effort, these two mechanisms of social contagion are 
particularly important for user-generated content (UGC). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
the first to disentangle consumer learning and network effects in the context of online video sharing. 
Previous studies on online video sharing using traditional Bass model to study the diffusion process 
have shown that the existing user base has a positive effect on future adoption but make no distinction 
between learning and network effects regarding the underlying mechanisms [56, 58]. To fill the gap, 
we differentiate the two mechanisms by examining how video consumers react to different types of 
information. Additionally, we categorize popular videos into high-quality videos and 
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attention-grabbing videos according to the consistency in their ratings, and examine the different 
impacts of the two mechanisms in their diffusion process respectively. Our empirical results suggest 
that both mechanisms affect the diffusion of social media content significantly, with consumer learning 
having a greater influence on high-quality content, and network effects having a greater influence on 
attention-grabbing content. The implications derived from studying YouTube can carry over to other 
consumer choice problems as well. 
 
Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework of Learning and Network Effects 
Literature Review 
 Identification of social contagion has long been recognized as an econometric challenge [38]. 
Failure to account for contextual effects or homophily often leads to an overestimation of the effect of 
social contagion. Aral et al. [7] distinguished influence-based contagion from homophily-driven 
diffusion using a dynamic matched sample of global instant messaging users. Within the framework 
of social contagion, studies have focused on distinguishing learning from other contagion mechanisms 
such as saliency effect (i.e., observed choices are more salient than alternative choices) and 
conformity concerns (i.e., the social pressure to adopt the choice made by the majority). Cai et al. [19] 
used a field experiment to show that observational learning, rather than saliency effect, affects 
customers’ choices. Shi and Whinston [52] studied observational learning in the context of 
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location-based networks.  
Network effects, or network externalities, have been widely studied as an important driver for 
the diffusion of technology products or services, such as standards [22], software [27], and social 
networks [33, 64, 47]. These products or services become more valuable as more people use them. In 
IT and electronic commerce areas, network externalities may develop from exchange, stability, or 
extrinsic benefits [27]. For the diffusion of user-generated content in social media, network effects 
mainly result from exchange; that is, each new content consumer adds potential value through 
exchange with other consumers [24]. 
While learning is generated by information externalities, network effects are created because of 
payoff externalities. In spite of this fundamental difference, they often coexist and even interact with 
each other in the diffusion of products or innovations [21, 23]. Rather than distinguishing 
informational externalities from payoff externalities, most studies have focused on using the 
coexistence of both to explain herding or informational cascades. Bikhchandami et al. [16] argued that 
an informational cascade resulting from observational learning is very fragile to small shocks, whereas 
the uniformity created by network externalities does not display the fragility. Moretti [41] showed that 
social learning is a more important determinant of sales in the movie industry than network effects. 
However, we suspect that the same can apply to online videos. Consumers have more precise prior 
information such as crew information, movie trailers, critics, and so on, to estimate the quality of a 
movie, but much less information for social media videos, considering the limited marketing 
campaigns and alternative information sources of user-generated content. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
a movie can go viral solely because of network effects, but social media videos might.  
In this study, we adopt the expectation–disconfirmation paradigm in marketing literature [44]. 
Based on this paradigm, customer satisfaction has three main antecedents: prior expectations, ex-post 
quality, and disconfirmation/surprise. We introduce these three key constructs in the analysis of online 
videos. In consumer satisfaction literature, prior expectations have been conceptualized as the beliefs 
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about a product formed by consumers’ prior experiences and exposure to firms’ marketing efforts [43, 
44]. In our context of YouTube videos, when consumers consider watching a video, they utilize 
ex-ante information, such as video providers’ reputation, to form their expectations of the underlying 
video quality. Ex-post quality is defined as consumers’ post-usage evaluation about how a product 
fulfills their needs, wants, and desires [39]. In Susarla et al. [55], the perception of an application 
service provider's service quality results from an ex-post evaluation of the service. 
Disconfirmation/surprise is defined as discrepancies between consumers’ expectations and the ex-post 
quality [44]. Consumers’ expectations will be negatively disconfirmed if the product performs worse 
than expected and positively disconfirmed if performance is better than anticipated. We use this 
paradigm to study consumer learning, by which consumers use information to infer product quality and 
act accordingly [59]. The positive (negative) disconfirmation thus leads to greater positive (negative) 
word of mouth and more (fewer) people watching the video subsequently.       
Hypothesis Development 
A Simple Analytical Model 
YouTube videos are experience goods whose quality cannot be fully observed by consumers 
ex-ante but can be ascertained upon consumption. Therefore, before consumption, consumers are never 
certain about the quality, but can always acquire useful information from friends who have already 
watched the videos. If the revealed information suggests that the true video quality is higher than the 
expected value, we call it positive disconfirmation/surprise. If the information suggests that the true 
quality is lower than the expected value, we call it negative disconfirmation/surprise.  
Learning is a process of adjusting beliefs about the quality according to disconfirmation. We 
build a simple analytical model of individual belief updating that can capture the underlying learning 
process discussed in our study. The literature on observational learning [12] examines the learning that 
occurs through observing other people’s behaviors. We consider a general learning model through 
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direct communication and discussion with, and observation of others. We capture the learning process 
with a Bayesian learning model, where each consumer receives feedback from peers and updates the 
prior belief of the video quality.2 The utility that a representative consumer ݅ obtains from watching a 
YouTube video ݆ is given by:	ݑ௜௝ = ௝ܸ + ߟ௜௝, ߟ௜௝ ∼ ܰ൫0,1/ߩఎ൯, where ௝ܸ is the latent quality of the 
video, and ߟ௜௝ represents the unobserved taste heterogeneity. Each individual knows her personal 
taste, ߟ௜௝. At time 1, video ݆ is posted on YouTube. Since there is no specific prior information 
pertaining to the video before it is posted, consumers share a common prior on the quality of the video, 
given by ௝ܸ ∼ ܰ ቀ ௝ܺᇱߚ, 1/ߩ௏ೕቁ, where ௝ܺ is a vector of the observable characteristics of video ݆’s 
provider before watching and the initial characteristics of video ݆ described in Table 3, ௝ܺᇱߚ is the 
ex-ante expectation of quality, and ߩ௏ೕ is the precision of prior for video ݆. Notice that the video is 
newly published, so no learning occurs at time 1. A consumer chooses to watch it if the ex-ante 
expected utility is no less than the opportunity cost of watching video ݆, ܿ௜௝: 
ܧଵൣݑ௜௝หܫଵ൧ = ௝ܺᇱߚ + ߟ௜௝ ≥ ܿ௜௝, 
where ܧ௧[ݑ௜௝|ܫ௧] represents consumer i’s expected utility of video ݆	at time ݐ given the information 
set at time t, ܫ௧. Accordingly, the probability that a consumer watches video ݆ at time 1 is: 
Π௜ଵ = ܲݎ൫ܧଵ[ݑ௜௝|ܫଵ] ≥ ܿ௜௝൯ = ߔൣඥߩఎ(ܺ௝ᇱߚ − ܿ௜௝)൧. 
With learning, consumers have more information at time 2 because they receive feedback from 
friends. We assume that a consumer i at time 2 has k friends. Among them, ݇ଵ friends have watched 
the video at time 1. These friends communicate to consumer i their ex-post utilities after watching the 
video, ݑ௠௝, where m =1, 2, 3, ... , ݇ଵ.  
As a result, at time 2, consumer i's information set consists of the ex-post utilities of some 
friends and the number of friends who have not watched the video. Consumer i at time 2 estimates the 
                                                 
2 Following Banerjee [12], the timing of consumption is exogenously given, and we do not consider the strategically behavior of 
delaying the decision making process to obtain more feedback.  
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quality by maximizing the likelihood of the observed evidence: 
ܮൣݑ௠௝,݉ = 1, 2, 3, … , ݇ଵ; ݇ − ݇ଵห ௝ܸ൧	
	= Π௠ୀଵ௞భ ݂൫ݑ௠௝൯ ⋅ Π௠ୀ௞భାଵ௞ Pr൫ܧଵൣݑ௠௝หܫଵ൧ < ܿ௜௝൯,	
where ݂൫ݑ௠௝൯ is the likelihood of observing ݑ௠௝. The maximum likelihood estimator, ܩ௜௝ଶ, is an 
estimate of ௝ܸ. It is unbiased and asymptotically normal: 
ܩ௜௝ଶ ∼ ܰ൫ ௝ܸ, 1/݀௜௝ଶ൯, 
where ݀௜௝ଶ = −ܧ ቈ൬డ௟௡௅డ௏ೕ ൰
ଶ
቉ [5].  
Consumers update the prior according to Bayes’ rule. At time 2, her expected utility becomes 
the weighted average of the prior mean and the maximum likelihood estimator: 
ܧଶൣݑ௜௝หܫଶ൧ =
ߩ௏ೕ
ߩ௏ೕ + ݀௜௝ଶ ௝ܺ
ᇱߚ + ݀௜௝ଶߩ௏ೕ + ݀௜௝ଶ
ܩ௜௝ଶ + ߟ௜௝. 
Note that as time goes on, consumers place less weight on the prior mean. Because consumers 
receive more information at time 2, the prior becomes a less important factor in the decision making 
process. The probability that consumer ݅ watches video ݆ at time 2 is: 
Π௜ଶ = ܲݎ൫ܧଶ[ݑ௜௝|ܫଶ] ≥ ܿ௜௝൯ = Φ
ۉ
ۇ
ఘೇೕ
ఘೇೕାௗ೔ೕమ ௝ܺ
ᇱߚ + ௗ೔ೕమఘೇೕାௗ೔ೕమ ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
ට݀௜௝ଶ/ ቀߩ௏ೕ + ݀௜௝ଶቁ
ଶ + 1/ߩఎ ی
ۊ. 
The decision making process proceeds in the same way at time T. Consumer ݅ has ݇௧ friends 
who decide to watch the video at time ݐ, where ݐ = 1, 2, 3, … , ܶ − 1. The probability that consumer ݅ 
watches video ݆ at time T is: 
Π௜் = ܲݎ൫ܧ்[ݑ௜௝|ܫ்] ≥ ܿ௜௝൯ = Φ ቈ
ߙ் ௝ܺᇱߚ + (1 − ߙ்) ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
்݃ ቉. 
where ்݃ = ට(∑ ݀௜௧௧்ୀଶ )/ ቀߩ௏ೕ + ∑ ݀௜௝௧௧்ୀଶ ቁ
ଶ + 1/ߩఎ, and ߙ் =
ఘೇೕ
ఘೇೕା∑ ௗ೔ೕ೟೅೟సమ
. 
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It is evident that ߙ் decreases with ܶ. As time ܶ grows, the probability of watching videos 
relies less on the ex-ante prior and more on learning. In the analytical model, If the revealed quality of 
the video is higher than the mean of the ex-ante prior, ௝ܸ − ௝ܺᇱߚ > 0 , we call it positive 
disconfirmation/surprise. If the revealed quality of the video is lower than the prior mean, ௝ܸ − ௝ܺᇱߚ <
0, we call it negative disconfirmation/surprise. We empirically operationalize disconfirmation/surprise 
as the difference between realized video views and predicted video views at time 1. This empirical 
construct corresponds to ௝ܸ − ௝ܺᇱߚ in our analytical model.  
In essence, learning is a process of adjusting beliefs about the quality according to 
disconfirmation. We obtain the following two results, and the proofs can be found in Appendix A.  
 Result 1: If positive/negative disconfirmation is sufficiently large, then Π௜்  is 
increasing/decreasing in ܶ. 
 Result 2: The distance between the true video quality and consumers’ expected video quality, 
| ௝ܸ − ܧ்ൣ ௝ܸหܫ்൧|, is decreasing in ܶ.  
 
Hypotheses of Learning 
Intuitively, if consumers learn about disconfirmation over time, a video that has positive 
disconfirmation will have a higher growth rate of viewership than a video that has negative 
disconfirmation over time. The expectancy disconfirmation plays a major role in determining 
satisfaction [44]. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with consumption experience is generally regarded as 
the key antecedent of product-related word of mouth [6]. As dissatisfaction increases, the tendency of 
consumers to engage in negative word-of-mouth activities increases [48]. In our context, the positive 
disconfirmation/surprise increases consumer satisfaction, and then leads consumers to engage in 
greater positive word of mouth. Therefore, the growth rate of viewership increases more over time in 
the case of a positive surprise than that of a negative one, which is consistent with Results 1 and 2.  
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Second, if learning is significant, we should observe that the magnitude of learning is 
moderated by the quality uncertainty of videos. The intuition is that the learning effect should be more 
pronounced for videos with less-precise consumer priors. If a consumer is very uncertain about the 
quality of a video, the impact of consumer learning is large: The additional information she learns from 
her friends should be more valuable than when she knows the quality precisely. Thus, learning should 
be stronger for videos that are less familiar to consumers. Combining the two predictions from learning, 
we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. In the presence of learning (informational externalities), (i) a video that has 
positive disconfirmation would have a higher growth rate of viewership than a video that has negative 
disconfirmation over time. (ii) Furthermore, positive disconfirmation has a greater impact on videos 
with less-precise priors.  
However, network effects, or network externalities, occur if the consumers derive utility 
directly from the consumption by others despite of the quality of the product. We test for the existence 
of network effects by examining whether consumers respond to disconfirmation that is irrelevant to 
video quality. If only learning exists, such negative or positive disconfirmation will have no significant 
impact on future views because it does not reveal the video quality. However, if network effects also 
exist, a lower-than-expected (higher-than-expected) views caused by non-quality factors, can still 
reduce (increase) future video views and trigger the feedback loop. In other words, the 
lower-than-expected (high-than-expected) views would lead to potential viewers being less (more) 
likely to watch the video. Therefore, the growth rate of viewership would be affected accordingly over 
time. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. In the presence of network effects (payoff externalities), a video that has positive 
disconfirmation that is unrelated to video quality, would have a higher growth rate of viewership than 
a video that has negative disconfirmation that is unrelated to video quality, over time. 
Both learning and network effects may exist on YouTube. Therefore, a video can go viral in 
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either way. Lee and Raghu [36] showed that the sales performance of an app depends on several 
important attributes that are related to learning and network effects. Through examining the most 
popular videos on YouTube, we can categorize them into two distinct groups: one group consists of 
videos that feature high quality, engaging scenes, and articulated story lines (high-quality videos), and 
the other group of videos often includes questionable behaviors that deviate from social norms yet still 
gains tremendous popularity (attention grabbers). The “Pussy Riot” incident in Russia serves as a good 
example of a typical attention grabber. This Russia-based feminist rock band protested against the 
political scene in Russia through unorthodox musical performances and produced YouTube videos that 
went viral overnight. It is worth noting that Pussy Riot did not gain international fame through their 
musicality per se; instead, most viewers were drawn to those videos out of curiosity and were 
interested in the messages the music carried. 
A strategy often adopted by attention grabbers is the inclusion of controversial elements in 
videos. Such instances often provoke controversy and stir heated discussion revolving around those 
contents. In contrast to those quality-oriented productions, the goal of attention grabbers is primarily to 
attract attention or promote ideas. Intuitively speaking, we would not expect too much learning effect 
to take place for the popularity of this type of video. In an analytical model, Eliaz and Spiegler [25] 
showed that a firm can earn higher profits by employing pure attention grabbers with positive 
probability. Similarly, we propose that, as suggested by their discussion-provoking nature, videos with 
attention-grabbing content can initiate higher network effects, and viewers find it valuable to watch 
them because these videos allow them to engage in discussions with their social contacts and generate 
more social sharing. Therefore, we hypothesize that attention-grabbing videos gains popularity mostly 
through network effects as opposed to learning, and the opposite is true for high-quality videos:  
Hypothesis 3. (a) Network effects (payoff externalities) are more pronounced for videos with 
attention-grabbing content. (b) Learning (informational externalities) is more pronounced for 
high-quality videos. 
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Data 
We collected data on newly posted videos from YouTube. As the world’s largest video viewing 
and sharing website, YouTube has enormous numbers of videos, which makes random sampling 
infeasible. Instead, we focus on the most active providers by selecting the top 1,000 YouTube 
providers (in terms of total video views) identified for June 2011.3 We collected a daily panel of data 
on these providers and their new videos for one month, from March 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012. Our 
sample includes 302 new videos published by top providers on March 1, 2012. We use one day as the 
time unit of analysis to capture the fast-changing nature of online videos. 
The provider level data include provider ID, data collection date, date when the provider joined 
YouTube, number of subscribers to the provider’s channel, total views of all the provider’s videos, 
total views of the provider’s channel page, number of videos, number of friends, number of 
subscriptions the provider has to other providers, channel views rank, and video views rank. The video 
level data include video ID, data collection date, date when the video is posted, the provider of the 
video, number of views, category in which the video belongs, video length, whether the video has an 
in-stream ad, average rating, number of times the video is favorited by viewers (number of favorites), 
and number of comments. All videos in our sample were published on March 1, 2012. Because 
YouTube Analytics data is updated daily, the first day in our analysis is March 2, 2012. Summary 
statistics of the video characteristics at the beginning of our data collection period are reported in Table 
1. We assume that each viewer watches a video only once. Although consumers may repeatedly watch 
a video, the bias caused by repeated viewings is small if logs of views are used instead of views [56]. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the characteristics of our YouTube providers. 
 
 
                                                 
3 To make our results generalizable to unpopular providers and to compare with top providers, we also identified 2,236 new providers 
who joined YouTube during January 2012. The basic results are robust. 
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Table 1.The First-Day Video Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of video views 1,717 6,882 1 107,628 
Video rating 4.73 0.51 1 5 
Number of favorites 89 399 0 6,800 
Number of comments 245 838 0 9,832 
In-stream ads (yes-1, no-0) 0.34 0.48 0 1 
 
Some YouTube providers also post their video links on Twitter. We control for these personal 
marketing efforts when estimating social contagion. Using Twitter application programming interface 
(API), we collected a random selected sample of all Twitter data containing the key word #YouTube or 
video. Using the collected tweets, we analyzed the included shortened uniform resource locator (URL) 
link related to YouTube and recovered the unique YouTube video ID. Then, we used a simple natural 
language processing on tweet content to identify the tweets posted by video providers as new video 
announcements, such as “I uploaded a new video … please check out.” For our sample videos, we find 
that around 5% of top providers did self-promotion for their new videos on Twitter.  
Table 2. The First-Day Chanel Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total channel views 8,292,525 1.72e+07 214 1.75e+08
Total video views 1.17e+08 2.09e+08 997 1.55e+09
Number of subscribers 187,852 392,605 51 5,109,145
Number of subscriptions 131 848 0 17,641 
Number of videos 184 257 1 969 
Number of friends 10,707 19,954 0 120,570 
Number of channel favorites 91 263 0 3,292 
Empirical Framework 
Identification of the Disconfirmation/Surprise 
Following Barro [14]; Hirshleifer et al. [30]; and Moretti [41], we empirically operationalize 
disconfirmation/surprise as the difference between realized video views and predicted video views at 
time 1 (March 2, 2012). More specifically, we argue that realized video views can be predicted by the 
information set of viewers before time 1, reflecting the ex-ante rational expectation of video quality. 
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The viewer’s information set includes two pieces of information: (1) the characteristics of YouTube 
providers (channels) before time 1, including the log of total views of channel j’s videos, lvviews; the 
log of total views of the provider’s channel page, lcviews; the log number of uploaded videos of the 
channel, lvideos; the log number of the provider’s subscribers, lsubs; the log number of other providers 
the provider subscribes to, lsubscriptions; the log number of times a channel is favorited by viewers, 
lchannel_favs, the average rating of the channel for all its videos, avg_chanel_rating; the variance of 
the ratings of this channel’s videos, var_chanel_rating; and the age of the channel (in terms of days), 
channel_age. The characteristics of YouTube providers are reasonable measures of expected video 
quality. YouTube allows consumers to subscribe to the providers they would like to follow. By 
subscribing to a provider, they are informed immediately whenever the provider posts a new video. 
The prior information about the provider shapes to a large extent a consumer’s expectation of the 
provider’s new videos. (2) The initial characteristics of a new video. When a new video is posted, a 
viewer can infer the video quality from some initial video characteristics, including a set of dummy 
variables indicating the video category, a dummy variable indicating whether the video was 
self-promoted by the provider on Twitter, tweet_upload, and a dummy variable, length, which takes the 
value 1 if the video length is longer than 10 minutes, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 3. Identification of Disconfirmation: First-Stage Regression 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Rating as Surprise
lvviews 0.497*** 0.493*** 0.498*** 0.0742*** 
[9.714] [10.27] [10.49] [3.024] 
lcviews 0.259*** 0.253*** 0.249*** 0.0451* 
[5.948] [6.374] [6.367] [1.729] 
lvideos 0.0180 0.00926 0.0121 0.0331*** 
[0.883] [0.492] [0.655] [2.832] 
lsubs -0.0707* -0.0662* -0.0667* -0.0176 
[-1.890] [-1.825] [-1.844] [-0.825] 
lsubscriptions -0.0194 -0.0186 -0.0194 -0.0275 
[-0.652] [-0.672] [-0.705] [-1.625] 
lchannel_favs 0.0200 0.0366 0.0380 0.0297* 
[0.653] [1.319] [1.373] [1.713] 
17 
 
length -0.0870 -0.0849 0.123 
[-0.657] [-0.729] [1.636] 
avg_chanel_rating 0.235** 0.268** 0.266** 0.102** 
[2.186] [2.552] [2.542] [2.278] 
var_chanel_rating -0.352* -0.373* -0.375* -0.515*** 
[-1.730] [-1.908] [-1.922] [-4.480] 
channel_age -0.000119 -0.000123 -9.92e-05 -0.000127 
[-1.107] [-1.291] [-1.095] [1.077] 
tweet_upload -0.185 -0.143 0.129 
[-0.740] [-0.591] [0.917] 
video category dummies Y N N Y 
 
Constant -6.523*** -6.984*** -7.057*** 5.090*** 
[-5.637] [-11.11] [-11.39] [5.886] 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.674 0.661 0.661 0.704 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
We use the residual from a regression of the log of the first-day views on the characteristics of 
YouTube providers and the initial characteristics of a new video as a measure of 
disconfirmation/surprise. More specifically, the predicted value of the dependent variable from the 
estimated linear equation including all independent variables is the rational expectation of the 
dependent variable (the log of the first-day views). The residual is the deviation of the actual video 
views from the rational expectation. The literature on rational expectations [42, 50, 14] asserts that on 
average, the deviation from rational expectation should be zero. Table 3 presents the first-stage 
regression results. The residual is used as a measure for disconfirmation/surprise. The correlation 
among independent variables and the variance inflation factors (VIF) are shown in Tables B.1 and B.2 
in Appendix B. Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3 show the regression results under different regression 
specifications (column 1: full regression model, column 2: without video category dummies; column 3: 
including only the characteristics of YouTube providers), with column 4 using another empirical 
measure of surprises: the difference between realized video ratings and predicted video ratings at time 
1. The results are consistent across these four different model specifications. As an additional check, 
we also construct a measure of disconfirmation using the difference between realized views and 
predicted views in the first week instead of that on the first day, and the result is robust.  
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A Test of Consumer Learning 
Figure 2 shows a clear illustrative example of videos with different disconfirmation/surprises. 
The figure plots the daily video views for a video with a positive disconfirmation/surprise (video 2) 
and a video with a negative disconfirmation/surprise (video 1). These two videos belong to the same 
YouTube video category and have similar initial views, but experience different growth patterns: 
Video 2, having positive disconfirmation/surprise, has a significantly higher growth rate than video 1, 
having a negative disconfirmation/surprise. The first-day views of video 1 and video 2 are roughly the 
same (304 and 449 respectively). However, at the end of our sample period, views of video 1 and 
views of video 2 are 1,102 and 25,508 respectively. This striking difference is likely to be caused 
by social learning over time.  
To formally test whether the difference between videos with positive disconfirmation and those 
with negative disconfirmation is statistically significant, we estimate the following model: 
 ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵݐ + ௝ܽ + Ψ௝,௧ᇱ ܾଶ + ܾଷ൫ݐ × ܦ௝൯ + ܾସ൫ݐ × ܧ ௝ܸ൯ + ߤ௝,௧,         (1)
where ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧  is the log of views of video ݆  at time 	ݐ , ݐ  represents the time period, ௝ܽ 
represents unobserved fixed effect of video ݆, and Ψ௝,௧ includes the characteristics of video ݆ that 
change over time, such as ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ (the video ratings), ݂ܽݒݏ (the number of YouTube Favorites), 
ܿ݋݉݉݁݊ݐ (the number of video comments), ݈ݒ݅݀݁݋ (the log number of uploaded videos of the 
channel), ݈ݒݒ݅݁ݓݏ (the log of total video views of the channel), and ݏݑܾݏ (the number of channel 
subscriptions). We control for the marketing efforts of YouTube providers on Twitter measured by 
ݏݑ݉_ݑ݌݈݋ܽ ௝݀௧, the total number of tweets containing the unique YouTube video ID and the word 
“uploaded”. ܧ ௝ܸ is the expected video quality measured by the predicted value of the dependent 
variable obtained from the first-stage regression described in Table 3. In the regression, ܦ௝ is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the disconfirmation/surprise of video ݆ is positive, and ߤ௝,௧ is the 
error term. We expect that ܾସ is not significantly different from 0 because the expected quality should 
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not change the growth rate of video views over time after controlling for other variables in Model (1).  
 
Figure 2. Daily Views for Videos with Different Disconfirmation 
 Following the literature on treatment effects (Wooldridge 2002), we make the 
unconfoundedness assumption: ݐ × ܦ௝ is strictly exogenous. Note that the correlation between ݐ × ܦ௝ 
and ߤ௝,௥ for any time ݐ and time ݎ causes inconsistency in regression coefficients. Thus, we need to 
control for the time-varying heterogeneity (Ψ௝,௧), and the unobserved fixed effects in the regression. If 
the disconfirmation assignment (positive or negative) changes in reaction to past outcomes on 
ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ , strict exogeneity can be violated [63]. However, because the surprise assignment is 
determined at time 1 and is independent of the idiosyncratic views shocks in period ݐ , strict 
exogeneity is a reasonable assumption. 
We are interested in ܾଷ. In the presence of learning, viewership trends for positive and negative 
disconfirmation videos should diverge over time. The coefficient ܾଷ  captures the size of this 
divergence caused by learning. If ܾଷ > 0, then the difference between the growth rates is positive, 
supporting Hypothesis 1(i). If ܾଷ = 0, then the growth rates of video views with different surprises are 
the same, which indicates no significant learning. 
The fixed effects regression results are shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows the results from a 
regression that includes all the coefficients specified in equation (1) except ܾସ. The cluster robust 
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t-statistics are shown in brackets. In this regression, ෠ܾଷ is significantly positive, which confirms 
Hypothesis 1 (i). In the regression model, after controlling for video rating, favorites, and comments, 
the impact of a positive disconfirmation is still significantly positive. The coefficient ෠ܾଷ is also 
practically significant. The effect of positive disconfirmation is considerable: A video that has positive 
disconfirmation can experience about 5% higher growth rate of viewership every day than a video that 
has a negative surprise. It is also worth noting that the coefficient ܾଷ reported in Table 4 is the upper 
bound of the learning effect, and we cannot rule out other explanations, such as network effects. As 
expected, Column 2 shows that ෠ܾସ is insignificant, which implies that the anticipated quality does not 
have a significant impact on the growth rate of video views. This result is reminiscent of rational 
expectations models: Only unanticipated factors affect real economic variables [14].  
Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression of Video Views on Disconfirmation/Surprises: A Test of Learning 
 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
Bootstrap 
(4) 
Tech/Music 
(5) 
Rating as Surprise
(࢚ × ࡰ࢐) 0.0503*** 0.0521*** 0.0503*** 0.0516*** 0.0324*** 
[25.60] [21.76] [21.23] [24.91] [22.45] 
t 0.0424*** 0.0331*** 0.0424*** 0.0402*** 0.0213*** 
[13.77] [10.24] [19.31] [13.81] [11.45] 
rating 0.0140 0.0237 0.0140 0.0137 0.0425 
[0.0210] [0.0728] [0.0222] [0.0205] [0.148] 
comment 0.000838*** 0.000822*** 0.000838*** 0.000832*** 0.000572*** 
[3.655] [4.040] [5.334] [3.658] [3.253] 
favs 3.13e-05 -0.000116 3.13e-05 3.07e-05 0.000148 
[0.116] [-0.542] [0.141] [0.114] [0.415] 
sum_upload 0.507*** 0.390*** 0.507 0.502*** 0.321*** 
[2.844] [2.984] [0.926] [2.845] [3.027] 
(࢚ × ࡱࢂ࢐) 0.00670   
[0.374]   
(࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢀࢋࢉࢎ) 0.0236***  
[3.192]  
(࢚ × ࡰ࢐ ×ࡹ࢛࢙࢏ࢉ) -0.0221***  
[-3.349]  
Observations 9060 9060 9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.286 0.283 0.286 0.289 0.235 
Robust t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Using residuals to measure unanticipated variables (disconfirmation) has a long tradition in 
macroeconomics and finance. A number of studies use the following two-step regression procedure to 
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estimate the effect of the unanticipated variables [50, 14, 30, 41]: First, the residuals from a separate 
auxiliary regression are used as a proxy for the unanticipated variable, and then the residuals are used 
as an explanatory variable in the equation of interest [11]. Simply using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
without adjusting for the extra variance of the generated regressor term (the surprise) can yield 
consistent estimates but invalid statistical inferences [45, 63]. It is crucial to address this issue in the 
context of social media because the data tend to be noisier. We use the two-step bootstrapping method 
proposed by Cameron and Trivedi [20] to obtain proper statistical inferences. The asymptotically 
refined result is presented in Column 3.  
As an additional robustness check, we add the lagged dependent variable as an independent 
variable and estimate the following dynamic panel data model: 
ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵݐ + ௝ܽ + Ψ௝,௧ᇱ ܾଶ + ܾଷ൫ݐ × ܦ௝൯ + ܾସ ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ିଵ + ߤ௝,௧. 
In a dynamic panel data model, a well-known “dynamic panel bias” could be caused by the fact that 
the lagged dependent variables are correlated with the transformed error term. In order to remove this 
bias, we report the Arellano–Bond estimator [9] by using the difference generalized method of 
moments (difference GMM) in column 1 of Table 5. After controlling for the log of video views 
lagged 1 period, ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ିଵ, the coefficient on the interaction term, (ݐ × ܦ௝), is still significantly 
positive, which supports Hypothesis 1 (a). A potential weakness in the Arellano–Bond estimator is that 
difference GMM performs poorly when past levels of the dependent variable convey little information 
about future changes. The Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond estimator [10, 17] allows the introduction 
of more instruments and can dramatically improve efficiency. The results are consistent and shown in 
column 2 of Table 5. After the regression, we also perform Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation in a 
panel: No evidence shows that the lagged instruments are invalid.  
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel-Data Estimators of Video Views on Disconfirmation/Surprises 
 
(1) 
Arellano–Bond estimation 
(2) 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation 
ܔܖ ࢜࢏ࢋ࢙࢝࢐,࢚ି૚ 0.213*** 0.456*** 
[6.072] [7.133] 
(࢚ × ࡰ࢐) 0.0402** 0.0413*** 
[2.426] [3.602] 
t 0.0233*** 0.0201*** 
[5.692] [6.074] 
rating 0.648* 0.576*** 
[1.930] [3.425] 
comment 0.000259*** 0.000186 
[2.746] [1.060] 
favs 0.000135 -3.81e-05 
[1.273] [-0.118] 
sum_upload 0.329*** 0.0430 
[2.669] [0.126] 
Observations 9060 9060 
Robust t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Learning effects may differ across video categories. We focus on two specific video categories 
on YouTube: “tech” and “music.” According to a survey by Sysomos Inc. 
(http://www.sysomos.com/reports/youtube/), music is the most popular category on YouTube, and tech 
is the least popular category. We estimate the following regression model in column 4 of Table 4:  
ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵݐ + ௝ܽ + Ψ௝,௧ᇱ ܾଶ + ܾଷ൫ݐ × ܦ௝൯ + ܾସ൫ݐ × ܦ௝ × ܶ݁ܿℎ௝൯ 
+ܾହ൫ݐ × ܦ௝ × ܯݑݏ݅ ௝ܿ൯ + ߤ௝,௧, 
where ܶ݁ܿℎ௝ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if video ݆ belongs to “tech” category, and 0 
otherwise, and ܯݑݏ݅ ௝ܿ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if video ݆ belongs to “music” 
category, and 0 otherwise. We find that the coefficient on ݐ × ܦ௝ × ܶ݁ܿℎ௝ is significantly positive, but 
the coefficient on ݐ × ܦ௝ × ܯݑݏ݅ ௝ܿ  is significantly negative. This finding indicates that learning 
affects videos of unpopular categories more. The implication is that the role of learning becomes more 
salient in a niche market than in a mass market.4 Column 5 shows that the results are robust when we 
define the surprise as the difference between realized video ratings and predicted video ratings.  
                                                 
4 An alternative explanation is that, in contrast with a tech video, consumers are more likely to watch a music video without asking for 
others’ opinions because once they find it is a good music video, they can watch it more than once in future. 
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Hypothesis 1 (ii) indicates that learning is more important for videos with less-precise priors. 
To test this prediction, we estimate the following model: 
ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵݐ + ௝ܽ + Ψ௝௧ᇱ ܾଶ + ܾଷ(ݐ × ܦ௝) 
 +ܾସ൫ݐ × ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ௝൯ + ܾହ൫ݐ × ܦ௝ × ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ௝൯ + ߤ௝௧,  
where ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ௝ is a measure of the prior precision of video ݆. Here we propose using the variance of 
the ratings of video ݆’s provider/channel’s existing videos at time 1, var_chanel_rating, to measure 
prior precision. Viewers are more certain about the quality of the provider/channel and thus his/her 
new videos if the ratings for his/her existing videos are more consistent. So it is reasonable to assume 
that the higher the variance in ratings of existing videos, the less precise the viewers’ priors. To 
operationalize, we define ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ = 1/var_chanel_rating.  
Table 6 shows that the empirical results support Hypothesis 1 (ii). The coefficient on 
൫࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢖࢘࢏࢕࢘࢐൯ is significantly negative. To interpret, we can consider two identical videos with the 
same positive disconfirmation except for the fact that first one was posted by a provider with a higher 
value of 1/var_chanel_rating. In the presence of learning, a negative ܾହ leads to a lower growth rate 
of views for the first video, as a result of learning from surprises. In other words, learning has a greater 
effect on videos with less-precise priors. The size of the coefficient on ൫࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢖࢘࢏࢕࢘࢐൯ is also 
considerable: If the value of 1/var_chanel_rating of the first video is one standard deviation higher 
than that of the second video, the daily growth rate difference is about 1.4%. Note that this moderating 
role of quality uncertainty on learning is a unique feature of learning, and cannot be explained by 
network effects. Our empirical results reported in Table 6 further confirm the existence of learning.  
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Table 6. The Effect of Prior Precision on Learning 
 
(1) 
FE 
(࢚ × ࡰ࢐) 0.0490*** 
[18.76] 
(࢚ × ࢖࢘࢏࢕࢘࢐) 3.10e-05*** 
[2.642] 
൫࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢖࢘࢏࢕࢘࢐൯ -3.43e-05*** 
[-2.757] 
t 0.0410*** 
[11.96] 
Rating 0.142 
[0.206] 
Comment 0.00102*** 
[3.621] 
Favs 0.000206 
[0.615] 
sum_upload 0.497*** 
[3.005] 
Observations 9060 
R-squared 0.324 
Robust t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A striking pattern in the data is that video views are remarkably skewed. For example, the top 
10 videos account for 47.46% of total views, and the top 30 account for 66.81% in our sample. 
Quantile regression analysis is particularly useful when the conditional distribution of video views is 
heterogeneous and does not have a “standard” shape. The quantile regression models allow us to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous covariates effects. We can examine the effect 
of disconfirmation on the entire viewership distribution instead of the conditional mean of viewership 
distribution by using quantile regression and gain a better understanding on viewership inequality. A 
simple differencing strategy used in fixed effects estimation shown in Table 4 is infeasible for quantile 
regressions since quantiles are not linear operators. Thus, we adopt an estimator that is consistent and 
asymptotically normal [20] to compute the quantile estimates. 
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Figure 3. The Estimates of Quantile and Fix Effects Regressions 
In Figure 3, we plot the parameter estimates ܾଷ of the quantile regressions based on equation 
(1). There are 19 estimated quantile regressions with 0.05, 0.10, …, and 0.95 quantiles. The parameter 
estimates of the quantile regressions are connected by the solid line, with the shaded area being their 
95% confidence intervals. The fixed effects estimate ܾଷ	shown in column 1 of Table 4 is plotted as a 
horizontal dashed line in this figure. We find that the quantile regression parameter estimates are 
significantly positive for all quantiles and decrease with quantiles in general. This suggests that the 
impact of a positive surprise is higher for less popular videos, because the same magnitude of positive 
surprises implies more pronounced social learning for less popular videos than for popular videos. 
Since most of popular videos are published by top content creators on YouTube and consumers have 
high ex-ante expectations on these videos, the impact of an additional positive surprise (social learning) 
is relatively small. For example, financed by venture capitalists and grants from YouTube, Maker 
studios produced a popular sketch comedy show called “AsKassem” for YouTube. Consumers who 
have watched AsKassem #1 - #70 form high expectations on the quality of the new episode #71. 
Figure 3 also indicates that the panel data model with fixed effects tends to underestimate the impact of 
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a positive surprise for less popular videos and tends to overestimate the impact for popular videos. 
A Test of Network Effects 
In this section, we test the existence of network effects by testing whether consumers respond 
to disconfirmation that is irrelevant to video quality (Hypothesis 2). We use the presence of in-stream 
ads on the first day as a source of exogenous variation (instrument variable) for existing levels of video 
views. YouTube in-stream ads run only on partner videos during our data period. Only successful 
content creators are qualified for the partner program, and videos published by them might contain 
in-stream ads. Note that all of our sample videos are published by top providers who have partnership 
status. If only learning exists, the negative disconfirmation would have no significant impact on future 
views because it does not reflect the quality of video content.5 However, if network effects also exist, 
the lower-than-expected views caused by an in-stream ad can still reduce future video views and 
trigger the feedback loop. In other words, the lower-than-expected views mean that a viewer’s 
colleagues and friends are less likely to watch this video. Meanwhile, the viewer has weaker incentives 
to watch it because this video is less likely to be discussed in social encounters. 
For a first day in-stream ad to be a valid instrument variable (IV) for surprise in Model (1), it 
has to be (i) correlated with the surprise indicator ܦ௝6 and (ii) uncorrelated with the error term ߤ௝,௧, so 
that an in-stream ad influences video views only through disconfirmation/surprise. We test condition (i) 
by regressing in-stream ads on the first day (ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝) on ܦ௝ with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, and find the coefficient on ܦ௝ is significant. Although we cannot test condition (ii) directly, 
first day in-stream ads are arguably independent of unobserved factors for video views later on, 
because all of our sample videos are published by YouTube partners (high quality YouTube channels). 
                                                 
5 In other words, if learning plays a dominate role in the diffusion, the negative disconfirmation will not significantly affect the word of 
mouth process on video content. For instance, when one’s friends recommend a new trending video, they are more likely to talk about the 
video content instead of the in-stream ads.  
6 We also do a robustness check when ܦ௝ is defined as the original disconfirmation residual instead of a dummy variable, and the basic 
results remain similar.  
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In our regression model, we have already controlled for the time-invariant video level fixed effect ௝ܽ, 
so there is less of a concern that any potential omitted variables in the error term ߤ௝,௧ would be 
correlated with the first day in-stream ad. Moreover, the inclusion of an in-stream ad is likely to cause 
negative disconfirmation because consumers may switch to other videos due to annoying ads. In our 
specific context, we assume that the first day in-stream ad could be treated as excluded from the 
equation (1). The major concern with this exclusion restriction is that if the presence of in-stream ads 
influences future growth of viewership other than through disconfirmation, our approach is called into 
question. Following Angrist and Krueger [3], and Acemoglu et al. [1], we conduct a test by including 
the term, (ݐ × ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝), as an independent variable in equation (1). The intuition is that assuming 
the only impact of in-stream ads on future growth of viewership is through disconfirmation, then the 
in-stream ad shocks should be insignificant in equation (1) that also includes disconfirmation. We find 
that when (ݐ × ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝) is entered as a regressor in equation (1), it has a t-statistic less than 1 after 
controlling for the interaction term ݐ × ܦ௝. It means that the future growth of viewership is not 
influenced by the presence of in-stream ads other than through disconfirmation. The reason is that in 
reality a viewer knows whether there is an in-stream ad only after she starts watching a video. 
However, even if condition (i) is satisfied, if the instrument is weak that ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝ is only 
weakly correlated with ܦ௝, IV methods can be ill-behaved so that seemingly very small correlation 
between the IV and the error term can cause severe inconsistency and therefore severe finite sample 
bias [63, 2]. For this concern, we test whether ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝ is a weak instrument, by calculating the 
first-stage F statistic based on the method proposed by Stock et al. [54]. For an instrument to be 
reliable, the first-stage F statistic in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression should be greater 
than 10. We examine F statistics from the first-stage regressions in 2SLS and find all of them are 
greater than 10.  
Our purpose of using instrument variable is to isolate the surprises caused solely by the 
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presence of in-stream ads, and to test whether the surprises specifically driven by ads would influence 
video views. The presence of in-stream ads is negative disconfirmation that can reduce first-day video 
views. If network effects exist on YouTube, the negative disconfirmation further lowers the views at 
time 2. As time goes on, we should see a significantly negative self-reinforcing feedback loop. 
However, such negative disconfirmation does not reflect any information of the video quality. If 
learning is the sole form of social contagion, we would not see a self-reinforcing feedback loop. 
We re-estimate model (1) to test for network effects, using 2SLS regression with the in-stream 
ads on the first day, ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝, as instrument for the surprise dummy ܦ௝. ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝ is a dummy, 
where ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝ = 1 if the video has an in-stream ad, and ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝ = 0 otherwise. Generally, 
2SLS is used to deal with endogeneity. We use the first-stage regression of 2SLS to isolate the 
disconfirmation caused solely by the shock of in-stream ads. We are interested in the IV estimator ܾଷ 
on (ݐ × ܦ௝), in the regression model (1). If the presence of network effects is supported, we expect that 
ܾଷ > 0, which implies that a video that has positive non-quality disconfirmation would have a higher 
growth rate of viewership than a video that has negative non-quality disconfirmation over time. In 
other words, a positive ܾଷ in the IV estimation implies that compared with positive non-quality 
disconfirmation, negative non-quality disconfirmation will lower the future growth rate of viewership. 
The coefficient ܾଷ = 0 would suggest insignificant network effects. The results are shown in column 
1 of Table 7. We find that ෠ܾଷ is significantly positive, supporting the presence of network effects on 
YouTube. Column 2 shows that the results still hold when the disconfirmation is defined as the 
difference between realized video ratings and predicted video ratings. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. In order to further address the concern of the endogenous instrument variable, we present 
the estimation results using another instrument variable, the weather on video publish days, in the 
online appendix. 
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Table 7. A Test of Network Effects: 2SLS 
 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
Rating as Surprise 
 (࢚ × ࡰ࢐) 0.0154*** 0.00864*** 
[25.62] [12.45] 
t 0.0312*** 0.0216*** 
[11.65] [10.32] 
rating 0.292* 0.128 
[1.655] [0.525] 
comment 0.000725*** 0.000228*** 
[15.40] [6.872] 
favs 5.22e-05 2.48e-05 
[0.799] [0.524] 
sum_upload 0.559*** 0.318*** 
[4.244] [3.534] 
Observations 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.248 0.226 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Prior econometrics literature showed that even if instrumental variables do not perfectly satisfy 
the exclusion restriction, we can still draw valid statistical inferences using the Anderson and Rubin 
(AR) test and the fractionally resampled Anderson Rubin (FAR) test [49]. As a robustness check, we 
further conduct these two tests in our IV regression and find that the p-values of the coefficient on the 
interaction term, ݐ × ܦ௝, are less than 0.01, which further confirms our Hypothesis 2.  
Application: How to Go Viral? 
We have shown that both learning and network effects exist on YouTube. To further test the 
two effects on high-quality videos and attention-grabbing videos respectively (Hypothesis 3), we 
estimate the following model: 
ln ݒ݅݁ݓݏ௝௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵݐ + ௝ܽ + Ψ௝௧ᇱ ܾଶ + ܾଷ(ݐ × ܦ௝) 
 
+ܾସ൫ݐ × ܽݐݐ݁݊ݐ݅݋ ௝݊൯ + ܾହ൫ݐ × ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௝൯ + ܾ଺൫ݐ × ܦ௝ × ܽݐݐ݁݊ݐ݅݋ ௝݊൯
+ ܾ଻൫ݐ × ܦ௝ × ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௝൯ + ߤ௝௧, 
(2)
where binary variable ܽݐݐ݁݊ݐ݅݋ ௝݊  indicates whether video ݆ is an attention-grabbing video, and 
binary variable ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௝ indicates whether video ݆ is a high-quality video. Here, we use views and 
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rating to empirically identify high-quality videos and attention grabbers. We define high-quality videos 
as those with many views and high ratings, and attention-grabbing videos as those with many views 
but mixed ratings. The co-existence of extremely high and extremely low ratings often suggests 
controversy. Specifically, if both the number of views and the rating of video ݆ at the end of our 
sample period rank among the top 25% of all sample videos, we consider it to be a high-quality video 
and ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௝ = 1; otherwise, ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௝ = 0. If the number of views of video ݆ at the end of our 
sample period rank among the top 25%, but the rating is in the lowest 25%, then we consider it to be 
a video with controversial content, and ܽݐݐ݁݊ݐ݅݋ ௝݊ = 1; otherwise, ܽݐݐ݁݊ݐ݅݋ ௝݊ = 0.   
Looking at the growth of views for a typical attention-grabbing video and a typical high-quality 
video as shown in Figure 4, we find that generally, for the attention-grabbing videos, views increase 
exponentially in the first week but only marginally thereafter, whereas for high-quality videos, views 
exhibit a gradual but steady growth over a much longer period. To study learning and network effects 
for the two types of popular videos, we estimate the regression models (2) and (3) using 2SLS with an 
instrument variable and fixed effect model without an instrument variable. In 2SLS, we instrument the 
surprise dummy ܦ௝ using the in-stream ads ܽ݀ܦܽݕ1௝.  
 
 
Figure 4. Growth of views for attention-grabbing video and high-quality video 
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
V
ie
w
s
04mar2012 11mar2012 18mar2012 25mar2012 01apr2012
t
------ Attention-grabbing video              High-quality video 
31 
 
The results are shown in Table 8. Column 1 reports the results from 2SLS estimation of 
equation (2) with IV. Column 2 reports the results from the fixed effect estimation of equation (2) 
without IV. We are interested in the coefficients ܾ଺ and ܾ଻ in equation (2). The estimation results 
show that network effects are significantly stronger for attention-grabbing videos but weaker for 
high-quality videos; the upper bound of learning is significantly stronger for high-quality videos. 
Therefore, we can conclude that learning is more pronounced for high-quality videos, whereas network 
effects are more pronounced for attention-grabbing videos, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Our result suggests that videos will be more likely to go viral through network effects if they 
provoke controversy and stir heated discussion. This result is consistent with some experimental 
evidence: Content that evokes high-arousal emotions (e.g., awe, anger, and anxiety) is more viral [15]. 
This finding can help YouTube providers craft contagious content and produce viral videos. Our study 
also provides empirical support for the strategic use of attention grabbers [25]. 
 
Table 8. High-Quality Videos vs. Attention Grabbers 
 
(1) 
IV 
(2)  
FE Without IV 
࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢇ࢚࢚ࢋ࢔࢚࢏࢕࢔࢐ 0.0105*** 0.0119*** 
[3.919] [5.119] 
࢚ × ࡰ࢐ × ࢛ࢗࢇ࢒࢏࢚࢟࢐ -0.125 0.0375*** 
[-1.059] [4.226] 
 (࢚ × ࡰ࢐) 0.0702*** 0.0494*** 
[19.91] [31.93] 
࢚ × ࢇ࢚࢚ࢋ࢔࢚࢏࢕࢔࢐ 0.0174 0.0276 
[0.0688] [1.394] 
࢚ × ࢛ࢗࢇ࢒࢏࢚࢟࢐ 0.0410 0.00589 
[1.106] [1.606] 
t 0.427** 0.416** 
[2.016] [2.024] 
rating  0.147 0.184 
[0.762] [0.108] 
comment 0.000721*** 0.000854*** 
[9.564] [19.02] 
favs 2.11e-05 -4.59e-05 
[0.261] [-0.708] 
sum_upload 0.596*** 0.552*** 
[4.362] [4.291] 
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Observations  9060 9060 
R-squared 0.223 0.260 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Conclusions 
 In this study, we examine the role of learning and network effects in the diffusion of social 
media content. Using data from YouTube, we identified learning by (1) estimating the overall effect of 
first day disconfirmation on the subsequent views, and (2) examining how this effect varies with 
different prior precisions. Network effects were measured by estimating the effect of the first day 
disconfirmation that is caused by in-video advertisement and unrelated to video quality, on the 
subsequent views. We quantified the magnitude of learning and network effects and found that social 
media content consumption is affected by both learning and network effects. 
A straightforward implication of our study is that YouTube should take learning and network 
effects into account when promoting the growth of video views. As the influence of YouTube on our 
society, education, entertainment, and lifestyle increases, more and more organizations, including 
government agencies, TV networks, commercial companies, universities, and so on, are all seeking 
their own presence and influence in social media. How to manage the influence of consumer buzz in 
social media is a challenge for practitioners [29, 37]. Our findings provide valuable insights on how to 
achieve this objective with videos on YouTube.  
From a managerial perspective, YouTube can play a much greater role in encouraging the 
creation of original content by leveraging the multiplier effect of both learning and network effects. In 
fact, YouTube has nurtured and subsidized individual content creation since its beginning. Tang et al. 
[58] showed that video providers are indeed encouraged by both reputation and monetary income to 
produce videos on YouTube. However, whether the average quality of the videos goes up as the 
quantity increases is still doubtful. Our findings suggested that instead of quality improvement, many 
providers are generating viral videos leveraging network effects. Although these videos also attract 
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views, how sustainable they are for video providers and YouTube in the long run is still questionable.  
Although in the present study we focused only on learning and network effects on UGC sites, 
our tests are relatively generalizable and can be practically carried out by practitioners in social media. 
We categorized the most popular videos on YouTube into quality-oriented videos and 
attention-grabbing videos, and found that videos with attention-grabbing content initiate higher 
network effects than quality-oriented productions. These findings provide a nuanced view of how 
YouTube providers can produce viral videos.  
Although this study has highlighted the importance of learning and network effects, we do not 
have social network data, and our work does not consider the effect of network characteristics and 
network topological structure on social contagion [28]. Further work could incorporate network data 
and Google Trends data on the keywords of the video to examine the effect of network structure, tie 
strength, and public opinions on consumer learning and network effects. It would also be interesting to 
examine under what conditions low-quality YouTube videos may go viral because of learning or 
network effects.  
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Appendix A 
 Result 1: If positive/negative disconfirmation is sufficiently large, then Π௜்  is 
increasing/decreasing in ܶ. 
Proof: 	
Π௜்ାଵ − Π௜் 
= Φቆߙ்ାଵ ௝ܺ
ᇱߚ + (1 − ߙ்ାଵ) ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
்݃ାଵ ቇ − Φቆ
ߙ் ௝ܺᇱߚ + (1 − ߙ்) ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
்݃ ቇ. 
We also have 
ߙ்ାଵ ௝ܺᇱߚ + (1 − ߙ்ାଵ) ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
்݃ାଵ −
ߙ் ௝ܺᇱߚ + (1 − ߙ்) ௝ܸ − ܿ௜௝
்݃  
= ߦ்൫ ௝ܸ − ௝ܺᇱߚ൯ − ൬
1
்݃ −
1
்݃ାଵ൰ ൫ ௝ܺ
ᇱߚ − ܿ௜௝൯, 
where ߦ் = ଵିఈ೅శభ௚೅శభ −
ଵିఈ೅
௚೅  
= ଵ
ටଵ/൫∑ ௗ೔೟೅శభ೟సమ ൯ା(ଵ/ఘആ)ቀఘೇೕ/∑ ௗ೔೟ାଵ೅శభ೟సమ ቁ
మ − ଵටଵ/൫∑ ௗ೔೟೅೟సమ ൯ା(ଵ/ఘആ)ቀఘೇೕ/∑ ௗ೔೟ାଵ೅೟సమ ቁ
మ > 0.  
 Since ௝ܸ ≫ ௝ܺᇱߚ and ߦ் > 0, we can let ௝ܸ be sufficiently large, such as ௝ܸ > ଵక೅ ቀ
ଵ
௚೅ −
ଵ
௚೅శభቁ ൫ ௝ܺ
ᇱߚ − ܿ௜௝൯	+	 ௝ܺᇱߚ. Therefore, We can obtain Π௜்ାଵ − Π௜் > 0. Thus, if a positive surprise is 
sufficiently large, then Π௜் is increasing in ܶ. Similarly, we can show that if a negative surprise is 
sufficiently large, then Π௜் is decreasing in ܶ. █ 
 Result 2: The distance between the true video quality and consumers’ expected video quality, 
| ௝ܸ − ܧ்ൣ ௝ܸหܫ்൧|, is decreasing in ܶ.  
Proof: | ௝ܸ − ܧ்ൣ ௝ܸหܫ்൧| = | ௝ܸ − ߙ் ௝ܺᇱߚ − (1 − ߙ்) ௝ܸ| = ߙ்| ௝ܸ − ܺ௝ᇱߚ| . ߙ் =
ఘೇೕ
ఘೇೕା∑ ௗ೔ೕ೟೅೟సమ
 and 
݀௜௝௧ > 0, so ߙ் is decreasing in ܶ. Therefore, ߙ்| ௝ܸ − ܺ௝ᇱߚ| decreases with ܶ. █ 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1. Correlations among Variables in First-Stage Regression  
 lvviews lcviews lvideos lsubs lsubscriptions lchannel_favs length avg_chanel_rating var_chanel_rating channel_age tweet_upload 
lvviews 1           
lcviews 0.6699 1          
lvideos -0.0188 0.0411 1         
lsubs 0.4726 0.4550 -0.1135 1        
lsubscriptions 0.0715 0.1566 -0.0278 0.1157 1       
lchannel_favs 0.0716 0.1501 -0.0563 0.1851 0.4643 1      
length -0.0592 0.0549 -0.1596 -0.0132 0.0218 -0.0385 1     
avg_chanel_rating 0.5232 0.3591 0.0022 0.3282 0.1257 0.1528 0.0079 1    
var_chanel_rating -0.1141 -0.0899 0.2136 -0.1846 -0.1129 -0.1575 -0.0065 -0.2115 1   
channel_age 0.0197 -0.0191 -0.0405 0.0420 -0.1125 0.0197 -0.2830 -0.0294 0.0402 1  
tweet_upload -0.0180 -0.0211 -0.0197 0.0271 0.0622 0.0102 -0.0208 -0.0221 -0.0459 -0.0744 1 
 
 
Table B.2. Variance Inflation Factor of First-Stage Regression 
VIF 
lvviews 2.63 
lcviews 2.37 
lvideos 1.28 
lsubs 1.49 
lsubscriptions 1.51 
lchannel_favs 1.60 
length 1.47 
avg_chanel_rating 1.51 
var_chanel_rating 1.20 
channel_age 1.43 
tweet_upload 1.06 
Note: The small VIF values show that the multicollinearity problem is not serious 
